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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

The District Court Erred in Failing to set Aside the order of Dismissal Pursuant to
Daniel's Pro Se Rule 60m) Motion.
Jil his

Opening Brief, Daniel argued that the District Court erred in failing to set aside the

order of disinissal for two reasons: 1) because Castle v. Hays, 131 Idaho 373,957 P.2d 351
(1998), does not limit relief in his case to only motions under TRCP 11(a)(2)(B) or direct appeal;
and 2) because Daniel did make a satisfactory showing for a grant of relief under lRCP 60(b)
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 18
Daniel offered two arguments as to why Castle does not preclude a motion for relief fro111
a final judgment under IRCP 60(b) in his case: 1) because Castle did not consider the
applicability of LRCP 6O(b) and does not hold that IRCP 60(b) is without meaning or effect when
a case is dismissed under IRCP 40(c); and 2) because, if Castle does preclude a motion under
IRCP GO@) in this case, then it is in conflict with the civil rules and should be overruled.
Appellai~t'sOpening Brief p. 18-21
The state has addressed neither argument as to why Castle does not preclude a motion
under R C P 60(b). Rather, the state has simply quoted language froin Castle and asserted that
the District Court properly applied this language. The state did not offer any rebuttal to Daniel's
argument that Castle did not mention or consider IRCP 60(b) and therefore does not preclude a
motion under IRCP 60(b). Likewise, the state did not offer any argument against Daniel's
position that if Castle does preclude a motion under IRCP 60(b), the11 it is in conflict with the
civil rules and should be overruled. instead the state only offers the assertion that "the district
court applied the clear language of the Court in Castle and recognized that it lacked the authority,

even as of the date of Eby'spro se motion (while he was represented by counsel), to set aside the
final order dismissing the case." Respondent's Brief p. 8-9
The failure of the state to offer any rebuttal to Daniel's arguments indicates that the state
could not mount any rebuttal. Indeed, it is well established that if an appellant fails to offer
argument in support of an issue, the issue is considered waived. Christensen v. City ofPocatello,
142 Idaho 132, 124 P.3d 1008 (2005), citing, East v. West One Bank, 120 Idaho 226, 230-31, 815
P.2d 35, 39-40 (Ct. App. 1991). And, while the failure of a respondent to address an issue does
not mandate reversal of a district court ruling, Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho
738,745,9 P.3d 1204, 1211 (2000), it is difficult to imagine that if a persuasive legal or
equitable argument against Daniel's position on the applicability of Castle existed, the state
would hesitate to offer it.
In the absence of any argument as to why Castle should either be held not to address the
availability of an IRCP GO(b) motion or in the alternative as to why Castle should not be
overruled, Daniel asks that this Court hold that his pro se motion was a timely and appropriate
motion for relief under R C P GO(b).
Daniel has also argued that as his prose motioil from the order dismissing his case was a
timely motion under R C P GO(b), relief should have been granted because through no fault of his
own, he was denied access to the courts and due process by repeated failures of appointed
counsel to present his case in a timely manner. Const. Arl. I, 5 13, U.S. Const. Amend. 5 and 14.
Opening Brief p. 23-24.
The state has offered only this argument in reply:
Eby has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion when it so

ruled, he simply d~sagreeswith the ruling because Eby's counsel was obviously
incompetent. (Appellant's brief p. 23.) However, the fact that counsel on postcoilvictio~lrelief is incompetent does not require the suspension of the rules of
civil procedure nor does it automatically afford a litigant the relief he seeks. See
Schwavtz v. Slate, 145 Idaho 186, 191, 177 P.3d 400,405 (Ct. App. 2008).
Respondent's Brief at p. 9-10
The state's reply misconstrues Daniel's argument. Daniel is not arguing that the motion
for reinstatement of his case should be granted simply because his counsel was incompetent. Nor
is he asking this Court to suspend the Rules of Civil Procedure. Nor is he asking that he be given
automatic post-conviction relief.
Rather, Daniel has argued that he was denied access to the courts and constitutional due
process by the repeated failures of various appointed counsel to present his case in a timely
manner and that this denial of due process is a sufficient reason to justify relief from the
dismissal. IRCP 6O(b)(6). Openiilg Brief p. 23-24
And, in fact, the case cited by the state, Schwartz v. State, supra, recognizes that
ineffective assistance of counsel which has resulted in a denial of due process in a postconviction proceeding may constitute sufficient reason for action by a court.
[I]f an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has been concluded, an
inmate may file a subsequent application outside of the one-year limitation period
if 'the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended
application. LC. 5 19-4908. Ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction
counsel may provide sufficient.reason for permitting newly asserted allegatio~isor
allegations inadequately raised in the initial application to be raised in a
subsequent post-conviction application. Additionally, when a second or
successive application is presented because the initial application was summarily
dismissed due to the alleged ineffectiveness of the initial post-conviction counsel,
use of the relation-back doctrine may be appropriate. This is so because failing to
provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to have his or
her claims presented may be violative of due process.

Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho at189, 177 P.3d at 403. (Citations omitted.)

In this case, Daniel had filed a tiinelypvo se petition for post-coiiviction relief It was
dismissed for inactivity because of the inaction of counsel. This inaction amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel which denied Daniel a meaningful opportunity to have his petition heard
and thus denied him due process. As noted in Schwartz, this denial of due process may be a
sufficient reason to allow relief froin the initial dismissal.
Daniel has presented a sufficient ground for relief under IRCP 60(b). He therefore asks
that the order denying relief be reversed and that the order dismissing his case be reversed.
111. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Daniel requests that this Court
reverse the order denying his motion for relief from the order dismissing his case and, further,
reverse the order dismissing the case. He also requests that this Court order the District Court to
appoint new counsel up011 remand so that new competent couiisei can finally file an amended
petition as appropriate.
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